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Few historical documents have both received more attention and 
spawned a greater division of opinion than Magna Carta. On one side 
stands its popular reputation; on the other its reputation among most 
scholars. The former is the enthusiastic opinion commonly expressed 
by speakers at meetings and dinners held to celebrate King John’s 
acceptance of the Great Charter at Runnymede in 1215. They praise 
Magna Carta’s role in establishing the rule of law. The Charter is said 
to have provided the foundation for later assertions of the supremacy 
of that salutary principle in the common law of England. It also 
influenced the constitutional system of the early American republic, 
and, even today, its relevance to securing the protection of human 
rights has not altogether disappeared. The latter, a negative opinion 
that a majority of professional historians seem to share, regards 
Magna Carta’s exalted reputation as a myth. In its origins, historians 
say, the Charter did little or nothing to promote good government. 
Nor, they add, did it serve to protect the legal rights of the great 
majority of English men and women. It served only the baronial class. 
Its glorification was a later invention, attributable to myth-making 
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lawyers like Edward Coke in the seventeenth century and William 
Blackstone in the eighteenth.1 
This Article addresses primarily the second of these two 
opposing opinions. It has an object in view—to narrow the gap 
between the scholarly view and the popular opinion by examining the 
jurisprudential assumptions that prevailed at the time the Charter 
became part of English law. These assumptions were not identical to 
those that dominate modern legal thought, and they need to be better 
understood if we are to evaluate fairly Magna Carta’s place in the 
history of our law. Such an evaluation will not prove that everything 
commonly said in praise of the 1215 Charter is true. Some of it is 
myth. But it is not all myth. Many of the negative characterizations of 
the Charter’s character simply reflect a different way of thinking 
about law than that which prevails today. 
I.  THE GREAT CHARTER AS MYTH 
The argument that Magna Carta’s reputation as a guarantee of 
civil liberties and human rights is misleading, even false, seems first to 
have been articulated clearly more than one hundred years ago by 
Edward Jenks.2 Reacting against the fulsome praise for the Charter 
found in Bishop William Stubbs’s Constitutional History of England,3 
the then-dominant opinion on the subject, Jenks fastened on the 
restriction to free men in some of the Charter’s guarantees. He sought 
to bring these restrictions to light in order to unmask “the false 
glamour which invests Magna Carta.”4 In fact, he said, it is likely that 
 
 1. See EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF 
ENGLAND *46 (stating that no man may be “dispossessed of his free-hold (that is) lands, 
or livelihood, or of his liberties, or free customes	.	.	.	as belong to him by his free birth-
right, unlesse it be by the lawfull judgement, that is, verdict of his equals (that is, of men of 
his own condition) or by the Law of the Land”); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *424 (“[Magna Carta] protect[s] every individual of the nation in the free 
enjoyment of his life, his liberty and his property	.	.	.	.”). For a current statement of the 
Charter’s status as discussed in academic literature, including examples, see generally 
NICHOLAS VINCENT, MAGNA CARTA: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 92–109 (2012) 
(discussing the Charter’s role as “totem and as artefact”). 
 2. See Edward Jenks, The Myth of Magna Carta, 4 INDEP. REV. 260, 260–61 (1904); 
see also Bryce D. Lyon, The Lawyer and Magna Carta, 23 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 416, 416–
18 (1951). 
 3. See 1 WILLIAM STUBBS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND IN ITS 
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 579 (lib. ed. 1880) (describing the Charter as “the first great 
public act of the nation after it ha[d] realised its own identity”). For a more recent and 
favorable evaluation of Stubbs’s treatment of constitutional questions, see James 
Campbell, The Anglo-Saxon Origins of English Constitutionalism, in LAW, GOVERNANCE, 
AND JUSTICE: NEW VIEWS ON MEDIEVAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 15, 23–25 (2013). 
 4. Jenks, supra note 2, at 268. 
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in 1215 only about one-sixth of the adult male population would have 
qualified for even the limited protection offered in the Charter’s 
clauses. Villeins, women, and some others were excluded.5 Most of 
the other clauses would also have had little positive effect in practice, 
even when their wording might seem to have applied. These clauses 
were reactionary in character. Many were actually harmful. “As a 
matter of fact,” Jenks concluded in discussing the institution of trial 
by jury, the Charter “delayed indefinitely the adoption of that 
wholesome reform.”6 The character of its clauses, attached as they 
were to the ancient privileges and immemorial customs of the 
baronage, infected the whole. They were the opposite of what was 
needed to safeguard English liberties. In short, Magna Carta was a 
document designed for the magnates, occasioned by their personal 
conflicts with the King, aimed at entrenching baronial privileges, and 
marred by an unwarranted reverence for outworn prejudices of the 
past. 
Most, though not quite all, of these negative characterizations 
were confirmed by the fundamental work on the provisions of Magna 
Carta by William McKechnie a few years after Jenks’s article 
appeared.7 For example, McKechnie argued that the intent of the 
barons was thoroughly backward-looking; they “professed to be 
demanding nothing new.”8 The correct reading of “freemen” who 
could claim protection under clause 34 was restricted to 
“landowner[s] with a manorial court.”9 It did not protect ordinary 
men and women.10 Constitutional principles like equality before the 
law and the availability of writs of habeas corpus, both of which 
“ha[d] been discovered in various clauses of the Great Charter,” were 
 
 5. “Villein” was the term commonly used by English lawyers to describe men and 
women held in a form of servitude to a lord. However, they were treated as free as to 
everyone else; they were not slaves. There was also a considerable variety in the services 
they owed to their lords. 
 6. Jenks, supra note 2, at 270. Jenks repeated this argument in his later work, 
EDWARD JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW: FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO 
THE END OF THE YEAR 1911, at 48 (Little, Brown & Co. 1913) (describing the supposed 
connection between Magna Carta and jury trial as “so long and so profoundly 
misunderstood”). 
 7. See WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE 
GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 109–38 (2d ed. 1914). 
 8. Id. at 111. 
 9. Id. at 115. 
 10. See, e.g., Janet S. Loengard, What Did Magna Carta Mean to Widows?, in MAGNA 
CARTA AND THE ENGLAND OF KING JOHN 134, 139–40 (J. Loengard ed., 2010) (noting 
that even the limited protection extended to widows did not apply if either they or their 
husbands were villeins). 
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not actually there.11 McKechnie concluded that what Stubbs and 
others had done in making a link between those principles and the 
clauses of the Great Charter had “diffused false notions of the 
development of English law.”12 It was commonly called “Great” only 
because it was long.13 
This negative depiction of the Charter’s place in English history 
received an emphatic boost from the publication, in 1957, of an 
influential book by J. G. A. Pocock: The Ancient Constitution and the 
Feudal Law.14 His conclusions echoed the equally influential work of 
Christopher Hill: Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution.15 Both 
used Sir Edward Coke, whose attitude towards the common law 
Pocock described as being “as nearly insular as a human being’s could 
be” in order to show that English lawyers regarded the law of their 
own times as having existed unchanged from time immemorial.16 In 
the seventeenth century, Coke is said to have believed, the common 
law was as it had been in 1215. In fact, he seems to have thought that 
the common law had not changed materially since before the 
Conquest. Institutions like trial by jury and government by 
Parliament had existed time out of mind; thus, they were unchanged 
and unchangeable. This was the “myth of the ancient constitution” in 
which Magna Carta played a prominent part.17 As portrayed by 
Pocock, Coke’s argument was that Magna Carta merely codified what 
had always been the common law, and that opinion was obviously 
false. 
 
 11. MCKECHNIE, supra note 7, at 133. 
 12. Id.; see also GEORGE BURTON ADAMS, THE ORIGIN OF THE ENGLISH 
CONSTITUTION 243 (1912) (dealing with the famous clause 39 (c. 29 of the statutory 
version) and concluding that it was “strictly feudal in character”). 
 13. Jenks, supra note 2, at 261. 
 14. J. G. A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 56 
(1957). Professor Pocock reissued this book thirty years later, with an addition in which he 
retreated slightly from his depiction of the insularity of the common law and also sought to 
clarify, but not to change, his position on the immutable character of English law as 
portrayed by Coke and others. See J. G. A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND 
THE FEUDAL LAW: A REISSUE WITH A RETROSPECT 337–41 (1987) [hereinafter POCOCK, 
REISSUE]. 
 15. Compare POCOCK, supra note 14, at 56 (chastising Coke’s alleged belief that the 
law was unchanging), with CHRISTOPHER HILL, INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE 
ENGLISH REVOLUTION: REVISITED 229 (1997) (characterizing Coke’s anachronistic 
interpretations as having been made “so lovingly and so inaccurately”). For a summary of 
the praise and the criticism for Pocock’s depiction of Coke, see DAVID CHAN SMITH, SIR 
EDWARD COKE AND THE REFORMATION OF THE LAWS 10–13 (2014). 
 16. POCOCK, REISSUE, supra note 14, at 56. 
 17. Id. at 36. 
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Of course, it is true that neither jury trial nor the House of 
Parliament existed in 1215.18 Instead, they were the products of 
historical development. It is also true, as critics pointed out,19 that the 
Great Charter of 1215 did not afford any direct protection to the vast 
majority of the English population. Clause 21, for example, stated 
that “Earls and Barons are not to be amerced save by their 
peers	.	.	.	.”20 Such a provision might protect ancestors of the Earl of 
Grantham and his residence at Downton Abbey, but it did nothing 
for the medieval antecedents of the middle class. It was the proper 
task of the modern historian, therefore, to recognize and make public 
the anachronistic assumptions about the Charter which had come to 
be revered as a palladium of liberty and due process. Coke and 
Blackstone shared responsibility with other members of their 
profession for creating this illusion of the Charter’s wide purpose.21 
Revealing what they had done required telling the truth about the 
contents of Magna Carta.22 Sometimes it required more; it required 
taking a thoroughly skeptical view of the enduring worth of the 
Charter’s provisions in modern jurisprudence. Viewed for what it was 
in 1215, the Charter was irrelevant in the modern world, critics said. 
This conclusion is the source of its separation from the popular view. 
 
 18. See J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 205–07, 507–
08 (4th ed. 2002). 
 19. See, e.g., Jenks, supra note 2, at 267–69 (noting that many of the privileges 
recognized in Magna Carta pertained only to the aristocratic landowning class). 
 20. MAGNA CARTA ch. 21 (1215), reprinted and translated in DAVID CARPENTER, 
MAGNA CARTA 46–47 (2015). 
 21. See, e.g., CHARLES OGILVIE, THE KING’S GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMON 
LAW: 1471–1641, at 1446 (1958). 
 22. See, e.g., CLAIRE BREAY, MAGNA CARTA: MANUSCRIPTS AND MYTHS 28 
(British Lib. 2010) (stating that the Charter was “not a statement of fundamental 
principles of liberty, but a series of concessions addressing long-standing baronial 
grievances”); CARPENTER, supra note 20, at 435–43 (discussing the many failures in 
Magna Carta’s enforcement); Jane Frecknall-Hughes, Re-examining King John and 
Magna Carta, in MAKING LEGAL HISTORY: APPROACHES AND METHODOLOGIES 244, 
246 (Anthony Musson & Chantal Stebbings eds., 2012) (arguing that the Charter was 
“primarily a tax rebellion”); Craig S. Lerner, Magna Carta and Modern Myth-Making: 
Proportionality in the ‘Cruel and Unusual Punishments’ Clause, in MAGNA CARTA AND 
ITS MODERN LEGACY 147, 148 (Robert Hazell & James Melton eds., 2015) (arguing that, 
despite popular myth, the Charter did not support a proportionality of punishment 
principle as was later adopted by the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution); 
ROBERT M. PALLITTO, IN THE SHADOW OF THE GREAT CHARTER: COMMON LAW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE MAGNA CARTA 16–18 (2015) (describing the “Myth of 
Magna Carta,” which argues that what the document meant to its signatories was quite 
different from “what is commonly supposed”); Michael Dillon, Magna Carta and the 
United States Constitution: An Exercise in Building Fences, in MAGNA CARTA AND THE 
RULE OF LAW 81, 98–105 (D. Magraw et al. eds., 2014) (devoting a section to “Creating 
the Myth of Magna Carta”). 
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It is this skeptical position that this Article challenges.23 Making 
good on this challenge requires examining the text of Magna Carta as 
it was understood and interpreted in earlier centuries. That 
examination must start with a look at the principles of interpretation 
of statutes and other legal texts that were prevalent in both the 
century in which the Charter was written and in which Coke and 
other common lawyers interpreted its clauses. 
II.  MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE 
LAW 
Magna Carta was taken to be a statute almost from its inception. 
It was an extraordinary statute, since it was “declaratory of the 
principall grounds of fundamentall Laws of England,” but it was still a 
statute.24 It could be (and was) amended. Of course, it had not been 
“enacted” by King and Parliament in 1215. This procedure did not 
exist at that time. However, it was very soon given the authority of a 
statute and treated as such by commentators.25 The Great Charter 
was not unique in this respect; several other early enactments that 
were treated as statutes shared an equal uncertainty about the 
authority by which they had been issued.26 Moreover, the Charter was 
expressly referred to as a statute in official documents from at least as 
early as the reign of Edward I.27 It maintained its place as a statute 
thereafter. The English “canon of statutes began with the 
confirmation of Magna Carta in 1225.”28 It was taken to be the first 
and oldest of the statutes. That was a position it did not relinquish—
from the production of manuscript copies of the “Old Statutes” 
during the Middle Ages to the publication of the double folio 
 
 23. For more moderate views, recognizing the ambiguities in the evidence, see 
ANDREW BLICK, BEYOND MAGNA CARTA: A CONSTITUTION FOR THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 37–44 (2015); J. C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 314–44 (3d ed. 2015); JOHN 
HUDSON, 2 OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 871–1216, at 847–63 (2012). 
 24. COKE, supra note 1, at *A Proeme. 
 25. See Margaret McGlynn, From Charter to Common Law: The Rights and Liberties 
of the Pre-Reformation Church, in MAGNA CARTA, RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 
53–69 (Robin Griffith-Jones & Mark Hill eds., 2015). See generally 132 SELECTED 
READINGS AND COMMENTARIES ON MAGNA CARTA 1400–1604 (John Baker ed., 2015) 
(covering readings on English statutes at the Inns of Court that so treated the Great 
Charter). 
 26. See BAKER, supra note 18, at 204–12. 
 27. See Assize of Novel Disseisin (Hereford 1291), reprinted in PLACITORUM IN 
DOMO CAPITULARI WESTMONASTERIENSI ASSERVATORUM ABBREVIATIO 286 (1811) 
(referring to Magna Carta as “statutum de Ronemede”). 
 28. BAKER, supra note 18, at 205. 
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volumes of the Statutes of the Realm between 1810 and 1822.29 When 
Sir Edward Coke placed Magna Carta first in the Second Part of 
Institutes, which he devoted to the exposition of English statutes, he 
was doing no more than following a habit normal among English 
lawyers. Any assessment of its interpretation (and its worth) must 
therefore take account of the Charter’s statutory character. 
So what? Does this classification matter? This Article argues that 
it does. Among other things, it matters because it requires us to seek a 
greater understanding of how statutory texts were interpreted in the 
centuries when Magna Carta was formulated and when Coke 
described its consequences in law. As Charles Donahue has said, “If 
we do not think about it, we are likely to assume that the men and 
women of the later Middle Ages shared our ideas.”30 Sometimes they 
shared our opinions, but sometimes they did not. On this subject in 
particular, time and distance separate the attitude of lawyers in earlier 
centuries from our own. I begin with the textbook examples, taken 
from the storehouses of the European ius commune. 
A. Continental Examples 
The normal starting point for describing and justifying the civil 
law’s method of statutory interpretation was a text from the Roman 
law. A provision in the first book of the Codex contains an imperial 
decree declaring that: “To follow the words of the law and not its 
mind is to offend against the law.”31 The decree proceeds to 
“command that all interpretation of the laws, both old and new, shall 
be carried out accordingly.”32 Other provisions in the texts illustrate 
how this might be done. In medieval practice, the principle that 
statutes should be interpreted according to established principles of 
law wherever feasible often dispensed with literal reading of legal 
texts, particularly when the literal reading led to results perceived to 
be unjust. This imperial decree was not simply a statement that no 
one should be punished in the absence of a clear law prohibiting what 
 
 29. See DAINES BARRINGTON, OBSERVATIONS ON THE MORE ANCIENT STATUTES 
FROM THE MAGNA CHARTA TO THE TWENTY-FIRST OF JAMES I CAP. XXVII, at 1–3 (4th 
ed. 1775) (referring to the Charter as the “most ancient of our statutes, which may at 
present be enforced”). 
 30. Charles Donahue, Jr., Conclusion: Comparative Approaches to Marriage in the 
Later Middle Ages, in REGIONAL VARIATIONS IN MATRIMONIAL LAW AND CUSTOM IN 
EUROPE, 1150–1600, at 289, 291 (Mia Korpiola ed., 2011). 
 31. CODE JUST. 1.14.5 (Constantine 439) (Fred H. Blume trans., 2d ed. 2008), 
http://www.uwyo.edu/lawlib/blume-justinian/ajc-edition-2/books/book1/book%201-14rev
.pdf [http://perma.cc/6CGZ-YP6W]. 
 32. This is the summary from the glossa ordinaria ad id. 
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he had done. In fact, it could function as the reverse; it could extend 
to punishing actions that were contrary to the intention of a decree 
even though they were not covered by the words themselves.33 
A simple example, one that would have been well known to 
every European law student who attended to his studies, was this34: A 
statute enacted for the city of Bologna punished any person who shed 
blood in the municipal palace. It so happened that a barber shaving a 
client within the palace cut him by accident, shedding his blood and 
thus falling afoul of the statute’s prohibition. Was he in violation of 
the statute? Did respect for a statute law require that hard result? No, 
the student would have learned. It did not. The purpose of the 
statute—its “mind”—was to punish those who purposefully shed 
blood in a location where peace should reign. It had not been meant 
to punish inattentive barbers. The statute’s drafters would themselves 
have provided for an exception had the barber’s case been called to 
their attention. One lesson this case imparted to the student, 
therefore, was that statutes were not always to be read literally. They 
were to be interpreted according to their purposes. How did one 
identify the purpose? That was pretty obvious in this case: to prevent 
intentional attacks in which blood was shed. The Bolognese example 
is analogous to the case of a sign reading “No Vehicles in the Park” in 
modern academic jurisprudence. Such a sign prohibits driving a 
vehicle into the park. It does not prohibit a statute which includes the 
depiction of a vehicle. Its words might cover erection of such a 
statute, but its intent would not. 
If the Bolognese barber’s case was the most familiar example of 
statutory construction in the Middle Ages, it now seems a slightly 
unfortunate one. Its result is too obvious. The greatest of medieval 
legists, Bartolus de Saxoferrato, said that the opposite result “would 
be absurd” and he was clearly right35 Moreover, this widely known 
example is actually an understatement of how far jurists were 
sometimes willing to stray from a strict interpretation of statutes. A 
better example that went a little further—also a common one in the 
early training of lawyers—was the question of whether a city’s statute 
criminalizing grain exportation in times of scarcity also forbade the 
 
 33. See DIG. 1.3.29 (Charles Henry Monro trans., 1904). See generally IAN MACLEAN, 
INTERPRETATION AND MEANING IN THE RENAISSANCE 142–52 (1992) (discussing the 
interpretations of the text of ancient Roman statutes). 
 34. See, e.g., Guido Calabrese, Two Functions of Formalism: In Memory of Guido 
Tedeschi, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 479, 481 (2000) (describing a slightly different version of the 
same example). 
 35. See BARTOLUS DE SAXOFERRATO, COMMENTARIA, COD. 1.14(17).5, no. 12 
(Venice, 1570–1571). 
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export of flour.36 Under the proper reading of the statutory 
prohibition, the jurists concluded, flour was covered as well as wheat. 
The statute’s coverage extended even to the export of bread, because 
bread was made in part from grain.37 The logic here seemed 
convincing from the point of view of the statute’s larger intent. Its 
extension achieved the opposite of the result that would have been 
reached had the rule of lenity applied. Yet, flour was merely grain in a 
different form, and the preservation of grain generally for the benefit 
of the people in the affected area was the statute’s object. Hence it 
should be extended beyond its words to cover what had been within 
the “mind” of the statute. The example would also have shown that 
invocation of a statute’s larger intent could expand its coverage as 
well as restrain it, as it had done in the Bolognese barber’s case. 
Another instructive example, one that modern scholars have 
investigated with care, moved far beyond the relatively timid steps 
towards expansive methods of statutory interpretation endorsed by 
the first two. Occupying the opposite end of the spectrum of juristic 
freedom in textual interpretation, this example illustrates the 
possibilities inherent in the methods just described. It comes from the 
use that medieval lawyers commonly made of the text: Quod omnes 
tangit ab omnibus approbari debet. The words meant simply that what 
touches all should be approved by all, and they came from a law of 
the Emperor Justinian.38 The same text was also included in the 
Regulae iuris of the medieval canon law,39 and it was commonly used 
in the Middle Ages to require the consent of those affected by 
taxation before they could be required to pay.40 The provision also 
served to justify granting the power of consent to representatives of 
the people required to pay the taxes. It thus served to advance the 
 
 36. See GUIDO PAPA, IN AUGUSTISSIMO SENATU GRATIANOPOLITANO 
DECISIONES, Dec. 373 (Geneva, 1667) (“Et quia ubi mens legis, idem plus habet quam 
verba, attendi debet ad mentem, sicut ad verba.”); see also JOANNES BAPTISTA 
HODIERNA, ELABORATAE ADDITIONES ET ANNOTATIONES AD DECISIONES 
MANTUANI SENATUS JO. PETRI SURDI, DECISIONES MANTUANAE UNIVERSAE, Dec. 
139, no. 2. (Naples, 1643). 
 37. See, e.g., BARTOLUS, supra note 35, at COD. 1.14(17).5, no. 10. 
 38. CODE JUST. 5.59.5.2 (Justinian 531) (Fred H. Blume trans., 2d ed. 2008) 
http://www.uwyo.edu/lawlib/blume-justinian/_files/docs/book-5pdf/book%205-59.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/VPC4-K83N]. A few other texts in Roman law contained the same idea, 
but always in the context of private law. See Constantin Fasolt, Quod omnes tangit ab 
omnibus approbari debet: The Words and the Meaning, in IN IURE VERITAS: STUDIES IN 
CANON LAW IN MEMORY OF SHAFER WILLIAMS 21, 25–26 (1991). 
 39. VI 5.12.29. 
 40. See Orazio Condorelli, Quod omnes tangit debet ab omnibus approbari: Notes on 
the Origin and Use of the Principle from the Middle Ages to the Early Modern Era, 53 IUS 
CANONICUM 101, 114 (2013). 
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growth of parliaments and other European representative 
institutions. In England, the words from Justinian’s Codex found an 
echo in Bracton41 and were used expressly in writs of summons to the 
“Model Parliament” of 1295.42 
As found in the Codex itself, however, the text said nothing of 
the sort. The words of the text simply stated that when several 
persons had been appointed as tutores (guardians) for a minor or 
other person under a disability, all of them had to be summoned to 
appear before termination of the joint grant of tutorship could 
occur.43 Were any fair-minded person to take a narrow look at the 
subject, the extension of this text to justify the growth and power of 
parliaments would seem an artificial stretch—too far-fetched to 
attract the attention of a serious student of the subject. However, the 
extension to cover taxation did in fact occur,44 and it happened 
because medieval lawyers saw in this text an underlying principle that 
was connected with due process of law. The “mind” of the text was 
applicable in public law, just as it was in the administration of private 
law. As guardians of infants have power to arrange the affairs of those 
infants they represented, so too could members of assemblies bind the 
people they had been appointed to represent. Although the public 
could be represented by delegates they had chosen, full consent of 
those affected by taxation was necessary. If this principle were to be 
applied in the case of guardianship, jurists thought, its rationale might 
legitimately be extended to cover a situation that had not occurred in 
ancient Rome. Its principle might apply more widely. 
This interpretation’s importance for the more general history of 
medieval law is that Continental jurists sometimes found a general 
concept or principle stated and applied within Roman and canon law 
texts.45 They so used those texts, expanding them and determining 
 
 41. 2 BRACTON DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 21 (Samuel E. Thorne 
trans., George E. Woodbine ed., 1968). 
 42. 1 THE PARLIAMENTARY WRITS AND WRITS OF MILITARY SUMMONS 30 (Francis 
Palgrave ed., 1827). 
 43. CODE JUST. 5.59.5 (Justinian 531) (Fred H. Blume trans., 2d ed. 2008) http://www
.uwyo.edu/lawlib/blume-justinian/_files/docs/book-5pdf/book%205-59.pdf [http://perma.cc
/VPC4-K83N]. 
 44. Gaines Post, A Romano-canonical Maxim, ‘Quod omnes tangit,’ in Bracton, 4 
TRADITIO 197, 236 (1946). 
 45. For fuller treatment see Bruce Brasington, “A Divine Precept of Fraternal Union”: 
The Maxim Quod omnes tangit in Anglo-American Thought to the Ratification of the 
Constitution, in BRIDGING THE MEDIEVAL-MODERN DIVIDE 205–06 (2013); Yves 
Congar, Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus tractari et approbari debet, 36 REVUE 
HISTORIQUE DE DROIT FRANÇAIS ET ÉTRANGER 210–59 (4th ed. 1958); Post, supra note 
44. 
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what they could mean in practice. The juristic technique known as 
aequiparatio—finding equality between terms that at first seemed 
distant from each other—proved particularly fruitful in this context.46 
It meant that where the reason behind a statute was clear, its remedy 
might be extended to a case not covered by its words.47 Some of the 
equivalences that early jurists discovered in the texts fit modern ideas 
about the subject. Some did not. More important than this speculative 
tie to the assumptions of modern law was the principle that the 
“mind” of the law was what mattered, and that this “mind” was 
presumed to stand in accord with recognized principles of justice.48 
Among other things, it provided an opening for application of 
principles drawn from the law of nature. Wherever possible, the 
words of a statute should therefore be brought to an understanding 
that was “sane, good, civil, and alien to evil.”49 Doing so facilitated 
occasional imaginative leaps, of which the use of Quod omnes tangit is 
but one example.50 
One should not, however, regard this particular example as a 
frequent event in earlier centuries. Jurists within the traditions of the 
ius commune were cautious men. They would not expand coverage of 
a statute if the statute’s “mind” was itself doubtful.51 They did not 
respond directly to the changing mores of the time, and they rarely 
made arguments without support from the authoritative texts and the 
opinions of their fellow jurists. Perhaps their expansive use of Quod 
omnes tangit was encouraged by the commonly accepted principle 
that rulers should act with good counsel, not least in matters touching 
 
 46. The common example was the interpretive efforts of medieval law professors to 
extend the privileges granted to soldiers in Roman law to themselves. The argument was 
that the Doctores were thought to be of equal “dignity.” See, e.g., BARTOLUS, supra note 
35, at COD. 12.1.1. 
 47. See, e.g., STEPHANUS GRATIANUS, DISCEPTATIONUM FORENSIUM IUDICIORUM, 
Tom I, cap. 82, no. 20 (Venice, 1649) (“Statuta enim extenduntur ex identitate 
rationis	.	.	.	praesertim cum statutum loquatur per dictiones multum generales.”) 
 48. E.g., D. CAESARE BARZIO, DECISIONES ALMAE ROTAE BONONIENSIS, Dec. 97, 
nos. 35–36 (Venice, 1610) (“[R]atio sit sicut anima et spiritus legis, verba autem sint sicut 
corpus et superficies, ratio legis est quae ipsam legem regulat.”); see also 2 ENNIO 
CORTESE, LA NORMA GIURIDICA: SPUNTI TEORICI NEL DIRITTO COMUNE CLASSICO 
317–20 (1964). 
 49. G. B. COCCINI, DECISIONES SACRAE ROMANAE ROTAE, Dec. 70 (Lyon, 1623) 
(“Verborum enim significatio debet ad intellectum sanum bonum civilem et vitio 
carentem applicari.”). 
 50. See JAMES GORDLEY, THE JURISTS: A CRITICAL HISTORY 43–46 (2013). 
 51. BARTOLUS, supra note 35, at COD. 1.14(17).5, no. 5. (“[S]ed si mens esset dubia 
non posset recedi a verbis[.]”). 
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the interests of their subjects.52 However, the jurists themselves did 
not say so.53 Except as one part of establishing a lawful custom, public 
opinion rarely counted as a formal source of guidance for the jurists. 
The example shows what was possible under principles the jurists 
accepted. It was not, however, an everyday occurrence in European 
courts. 
B. English Examples 
Many commonalities existed between the early development of 
European and English common law; for example, the method of 
interpreting statutes found in the ius commune was also used in 
England from the common law’s early days. Sir Edward Coke himself 
began his commentary on Magna Carta by stating that the Charter’s 
“mind” was surely great even though it was contained within a small 
body.54 Common lawyers had their own textbook examples 
paralleling the case involving the Bolognese prohibition against 
shedding blood,55 and they recognized examples of interpretation that 
departed even further from a literal interpretation. Some early 
English judges could even add words to statutes they believed had 
been omitted by oversight, thus providing a remedy in a case where a 
literal reading of a statute would have left aggrieved parties without 
relief.56 What was called the “equity of a statute” sometimes allowed 
courts of the common law to extend statutory protection in similar 
circumstances even where the words of the statute taken literally 
would not cover them.57 
 
 52. For relevant textual authorities and discussion, see R. H. Helmholz, Magna Carta 
and the ius commune, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 322–24 (1999). 
 53. See, e.g., Emanuele Conte, “Defensa”: Resistance Against Unjust Power in the 
Medieval Learned Law (12th–13th Centuries), in REVOLTEN UND POLITISCHE 
VERBRECHEN ZWISCHEN DEM 12. UND 19. JAHRHUNDERT 121, 123 (2013) (noting the 
“isolation” of legal science from the political and social “realities” during the late 
medieval period). 
 54. COKE, supra note 1, at *A Proeme (“Mens tamen in parvo corpore magna fuit,” 
comparing it to Alexander the Great, whose prowess was great even though his body was 
small). 
 55. See, e.g., Reniger v. Fogossa (1550) 75 Eng. Rep. 1, 29; 1 Plowden 1, 18 (laws 
against beating not applicable to beating a person of unsound mind in order to prevent a 
greater harm likely to be initiated by the person beaten). 
 56. See J. H. BAKER & S. F. C. MILSON, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY: 
PRIVATE LAW TO 1750, at 52–53 (1986) (detailing the 1312 English case Belyng v. Anon). 
 57. For examples, see NORMAN DOE, FUNDAMENTAL AUTHORITY IN LATE 
MEDIEVAL ENGLISH LAW 104–07 (1990). For later examples, see generally Rex v. 
Slaughter (1699) 90 Eng. Rep. 936; Holt K.B. 69; Acton v. Pitcher (1599) 74 Eng. Rep. 723; 
4 Leo. 51; Smith v. Vanger Colgay (1595) 78 Eng. Rep. 630; Cro. Eliz. 384; Milward v. 
Clerk (1590) 78 Eng. Rep. 446; Cro. Eliz. 190. 
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This approach survived the Middle Ages. Edmond Plowden (d. 
1585) expressed it with clarity in a Tudor case: 
It is not the words of the law, but the internal sense of it that 
makes the law, and our law (like all others) consists of two 
parts, viz. of body and soul, the letter of the law is the body of 
the law, but the sense and reason of the law is [its] soul.58 
Lord Mansfield later gave voice to this same sentiment in only a 
slightly different fashion: “A Statute very seldom can take in all 
cases,” he wrote, “therefore the common law, that works itself pure 
by rules drawn from the fountain of justice, is for this reason superior 
to an act of Parliament.”59 
As on the Continent, English judges did not employ this 
principle as an “open sesame” to rewrite the texts of Parliamentary 
statutes.60 In fact, often they applied the words in a literal fashion, 
even over substantial objections, and when they did go farther afield, 
the umbrella under which they normally acted was what Sir John 
Baker has called “the presumption of righteous intentions.”61 They 
presumed that ambiguous or incomplete phrasing in a statute had 
been meant by the law makers to achieve a just result. This reading of 
Parliament’s intent was normally enough to prevent miscarriages of 
justice that would have been compelled by a literal interpretation of 
statutes. 
Cases described in T. F. T. Plucknett’s exploration of the 
treatment of statutes during the fourteenth century provide several 
examples of the power this principle of statutory interpretation held.62 
The statute De donis, for example, prohibited alienation of lands 
conveyed in fee tail by the initial donee in tail, but it did not prohibit 
alienation by the issue of the initial donee.63 In other words, the 
restriction on alienation of lands held by fee tail would bind takers in 
tail for only one generation. Objection to this literal interpretation of 
De donis was raised in a case early in the reign of Edward II. In 
 
 58. Eyston v. Studd (1574) 75 Eng. Rep. 688, 694–95; 2 Plowden 459, 464–65; see also 
Rex v. Prin. (1663) 83 Eng. Rep. 1131–32; 1 Keble 594–95. 
 59. Omychund v. Barker (1744) 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 23; 1 Atk. 21, 33. 
 60. E.g., Rex v. Inhabitants of Haughton (1718) 93 Eng. Rep. 399, 400; 1 Str. 83, 85. 
 61. Sir John Baker, Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Renaissance England, 2 
NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 3, 20 (2004). 
 62. THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, STATUTES & THEIR INTERPRETATION IN THE 
FIRST HALF OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 51–52 (1922); see also 2 STEFAN 
VOGENAUER, DIE AUSLEGUNG VON GESETZEN IN ENGLAND UND AUF DEM 
KONTINENT 673–81 (2001). 
 63. The Statute of Westminster the Second (De Donis Conditionalibus) 1285, 13 Edw. 
1, st. 2, c. 1. 
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consequence, the judge held the prohibition endured because “the 
statute meant to bind the issue in fee tail as well as the feoffees until 
the tail had reached the fourth degree; and it was only through 
negligence that [the drafter] omitted to insert express words to that 
effect.”64 The judge was thus able to give effect to what he believed 
the true intent of the statute had been—a method which Plucknett 
described as a “drastic piece of underpinning,” also taking note that 
the result was “suspected [to be] of Roman origin.”65 This method 
was also found among the Novels of the Emperor Justinian in the 
Corpus iuris civilis.66 
In any event, the results of applying this principle of statutory 
interpretation lasted beyond the Middle Ages. Exclusion from the 
law’s reach of conduct made unlawful or ineffective under literal 
readings of the Statute of Frauds67 or the Statute of Limitations68 later 
provided examples of equivalent exercises of judicial discretion. They 
looked beyond the words used by the legislature. The Statute of 
Frauds declares many acts and agreements unenforceable unless they 
are reduced to written form. However, English judges have not 
hesitated to enforce oral agreements when failure to do so would 
itself amount to permitting a fraud. Allowing one person to take 
unfair advantage of a neighbor was not what Parliament had meant to 
permit. The “spirit” of the Statute has always been to prevent fraud. 
Its literal interpretation, however, sometimes could actually 
encourage fraud, and common law judges acted to prevent this. They 
acted in accordance with what one commentator described as “their 
supreme duty as courts of equity and conscience.”69 
Assuming this position also allowed English judges to avoid 
some of the consequences of their notoriously harsh criminal laws. 
The extension of “benefit of clergy” to cover laymen as well as men in 
holy orders is probably the most familiar example.70 As was true on 
 
 64. YB 5 Edw. 2, Pasch, pl. 2 (1312), reprinted in 31 SELDEN SOCIETY YEAR BOOK 
SERIES 176–77 (1915). 
 65. PLUCKNETT, supra note 62, at 52. 
 66. NOV. 159.pr (555) (Fred H. Blume trans., 2d ed. 2009), http://www.uwyo.edu
/lawlib/blume-justinian/ajc-edition-2/novels/141-168/novel%20159_replacement.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3LT3-TB57]. 
 67. An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuryes 1677, 29 Car. II, c. 3. 
 68. An Act for Lymytacion of Accions, and for Avoyding of Suite in Lawe 1624, 21 
Jac. I, c. 16. 
 69. CAUSTEN BROWNE, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS §	437 (5th ed. 1895). 
 70. See R.N. SWANSON, CHURCH AND SOCIETY IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 149–
53 (1989). The relevant statute was An Ordinance for the Clergy 1352, 25 Edw. 3, st. 6, c. 
3. 
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the Continent, however, invoking of the “mind” of the statute was not 
a code word for a “get out of jail free” card. The approach did not 
routinely excuse criminal defendants from compliance with the 
penalties provided for in the statutes.71 In fact, it could work the 
opposite way by convicting men whose conduct appeared to be 
outside the express language of a statute. 
This side of statutory interpretation is well illustrated in a case 
from Coke’s Reports.72 The residents of a hundred in Essex were 
fined for their failure to pursue a fleeing robber.73 They denied any 
liability, however, citing the common law rule that liability to the 
Crown attached only for robberies committed during daylight 
hours—the reasoning being that during the night most men were 
properly “at rest” and could not practically be expected to pursue 
fleeing felons.74 The robber in this case had in fact acted and escaped 
under cover of night. Coke’s account of the case, however, invoked 
the Statute of Winchester (1285)75 in rejecting this plea by the 
hundred’s residents.76 That statute began by reciting the dangers of an 
increasing number of robberies, murders, burnings and thefts.77 It 
went on to require that “great Towns, being walled” keep their gates 
closed at night and imposed liability on the towns if a felon made his 
escape because of a lapse in that requirement.78 The words of the 
statute obviously did not contemplate a rural hundred, but the 
residents of this hamlet were fined nonetheless. Coke justified this 
result, however, saying that the common law’s extension to cover 
nighttime escapes regardless of the size of the town was proper. He 
added that “[t]he Act hath changed the reason of the law, and 
therefore the law itself is changed; for ratio legis est anima.”79 Coke’s 
sentiments on statutory interpretation thus mirrored those of his 
European counterparts. He recognized that statutes could have a 
mind apart from their words. 
 
 71. Cf. CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 475 (5th ed. 1951) (noting 
how judges carry out both the will of the legislature and their own judicial logic in 
determining liability). 
 72. Milborn’s Case (1577) 77 Eng. Rep. 420; 7 Co. Rep. 6b. 
 73. A hundred was an ancient subdivision of a county or shire. 
 74. Milborn’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 421; 7 Co. Rep. at 6b. 
 75. The Statute of Winchester 1285, 13 Edw. 1, st. 1, c. 1–6. 
 76. Milborn’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 421; 7 Co. Rep. at 7a. 
 77. 13 Edw. 1, st. 1, c. 1. 
 78. Id. c. 4. 
 79. Milborn’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 421; 7 Co. Rep. at 7a. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1475 (2016) 
1490 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
III.  STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND LATER COMMENTARY ON 
MAGNA CARTA 
The reason for examining the clauses of Magna Carta in light of 
the contemporary methods of statutory interpretation is to show that 
some of what now seem like anachronistic readings that were made of 
its provisions in later centuries actually fit within contemporary ideas 
about how statutes should be interpreted. Commentators could look 
beyond the words of the Charter to its “mind.” Once discovered, that 
“mind” gave judges considerable latitude in decisions. An 
appropriate way of developing this theme is to return to the pivotal 
figure of Sir Edward Coke. He has often been cast as one of those 
most clearly responsible for the creation of the myth of Magna Carta. 
His Institutes were influential, and they dealt with the Charter at 
length.80 
What does such an examination show? It shows three things—
the first of which is that this text contains less “myth making” than 
some of Coke’s modern critics have suggested. In interpreting 
“judgment by peers” in clause 39 (c. 29 in the later statutory version), 
for example, he did not equate the term “judgment of peers” with a 
common law jury. Rather, he recognized the limitation in its 
applicability to only the nobility. Coke took some pains to describe 
what was implied by the words “lawful judgment” (per legale 
judicium), but he made clear that this particular clause dealt with the 
nobility alone.81 He therefore distinguished the import of this clause 
from ordinary procedures in the common law. Where a jury gave a 
verdict, he noted, the noble peers simply returned “their verdict upon 
their honour and ligeance to the King[.]”82 The clause’s reference was 
not to a common law jury. Similarly, although Coke mentioned the 
existence of Parliament several times in his coverage of the Charter, 
he did so in the context of Parliament’s then current role in English 
government.83 That was his primary task—explaining the applicable 
law found in the Charter. He did not claim to be presenting a 
historical account of its enactment. Even so, in its treatment in Coke’s 
 
 80. The second part of the Institutes was published only in 1642; its description of 
Magna Carta is given an expansive reading in CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION 
AND THE THRONE 515–18 (1956). A more measured interpretation is found in ANTHONY 
ARLIDGE & IGOR JUDGE, MAGNA CARTA UNCOVERED 121–28 (2014). 
 81. COKE, supra note 1, at *48–49. 
 82. Id. 
 83. E.g., id. *35 (describing dukes, marquesses, and viscounts as “lords of parliament” 
and stating that “there were no Dukes, Marquesses, or viscounts within England at the 
making of the Statute”). 
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Institutes, no actual assertion of the Charter’s enactment by 
Parliament can be found. 
The second “surprise” that emerges from reading Coke’s 
discussion is how often he acknowledged the possibility, indeed the 
reality, of change in English law. He did say that the Charter was 
“declaratory of the ancient Law and Liberty of England,”84 but he 
also noted places where time had brought amendments to existing law 
and practice.85 He even recognized the possibility of change in the law 
by desuetude.86 In interpreting Magna Carta, Coke was far from the 
prisoner of the anachronistic belief that English law had remained the 
same from the Laws of Aethelred onwards. He liked to express the 
nature of the change that had occurred by using aphorisms. “[O]ut of 
the old fields must come the new corne” was one favorite.87 The 
image of creating new procedures “as out of a root” was another.88 
These were two ways he used to describe changes that had occurred 
in English law, changes that Coke apparently admired. Coke’s two 
images also had the merit of accuracy. They described ways in which a 
legal system does change, and Coke’s account of Magna Carta 
recognized some of the possibilities they had made possible. 
Third, Coke’s treatment of Magna Carta utilized the commonly 
accepted method of statutory interpretation described in the body of 
this Article. It was a cautious use, and only an occasional one. But it is 
there. That is, Coke (and later Blackstone) understood that the words 
of a statute like Magna Carta could contain a principle capable of 
producing results greater than those that were readily apparent from 
its text. His treatment of guarantees of rights to “free men” provides a 
good example. According to Coke, this clause extended to women 
and even to villeins.89 Why? It did so because in practice, the word 
“men” was commonly understood in law to refer to women as well as 
to men. And as for villeins, English law, as it had been developed, 
included them in the category of free men. This happened because 
 
 84. Id. *3. 
 85. E.g., id. *18–19 (describing “[n]on seisiemus terram aliquam[,]” limiting the King’s 
existing power to levy execution to collect debts owed to him); id. *42, (describing “[b]revi 
inquisitionis,” as the enlargement of the possibility of relief from imprisonment by bail). 
This point is well made in Anthony Musson, Myth, Mistake, Invention? Excavating the 
Foundations of the English Legal Tradition, in 6 LAW AND HISTORY: CURRENT LEGAL 
ISSUES 63 (2003) (Andrew Lewis & Michael Lobban eds., 2004). 
 86. COKE, supra note 1, at *31 (describing “[c]onstabularius,” which is the 
disappearance of “infangenthief and outfangenthief”). 
 87. Id. *22. 
 88. Id. *46. 
 89. Id. 
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villeins were regarded as free against everyone but their lords. In 
other words, they could be regarded as “free men” in most parts of 
the law, with only one exception. The way was thereby opened to 
their inclusion among those protected by the Great Charter’s text,90 
and, as it turned out, this actually happened.91 
At another place in this commentary, in dealing with the clause 
that forbade the erection of fish weirs in the Thames and Medway 
rivers,92 Coke similarly interpreted the prohibition to cover more than 
obstacles to navigation. According to Coke, it included all 
purprestures.93 Purpresture was then a general term, meaning an 
encroachment on the public’s right to land, such as by erecting an 
obstruction on a highway to prevent its use by others. In other words, 
Coke understood the term “fish weirs” to embrace encroachments on 
land as well as on navigable waters. The principle underlying the 
prohibition of the obstructions to navigation generally thus extended 
further than the words themselves. It was meant to protect freedom 
of movement. Like most English lawyers, Coke did not use the phrase 
“mind of the statute” to describe what he looked for in interpreting 
this clause in the Great Charter. The term “equity” or “spirit” of a 
statute was the more normal term in England.94 But it came to the 
same thing. 
CONCLUSION 
In their commentaries on Magna Carta, Coke and Blackstone 
were performing a common legal task—interpreting an authoritative 
precedent to address a current issue. In doing so, they were 
encouraged to give expansive readings to Magna Carta by applying a 
commonly accepted method of statutory interpretation of their time. 
This method looked beyond specific words used in the statute. It 
looked to the goals and purposes of the enactment, which were in 
accord with principles of right and justice. These goals were thought 
 
 90. For background on this topic, see SELECTED READINGS AND COMMENTARIES 
ON MAGNA CARTA, supra note 25, at lxix–lxxiv. 
 91. Paul Vinogradoff, Clause 39, in MAGNA CARTA COMMEMORATION ESSAYS 78–
95 (Henry E. Malden ed., 1917); see also CHARLES M. GRAY, COPYHOLD, EQUITY AND 
THE COMMON LAW (1963). 
 92. MAGNA CARTA ch. 33 (1215), reprinted and translated in CARPENTER, supra note 
20, at 50–51. 
 93. See COKE, supra note 1, at *38. 
 94. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *61; see also John V. Orth, 
Blackstone’s Rules on the Construction of Statutes, in BLACKSTONE AND HIS 
COMMENTARIES: BIOGRAPHY, LAW, HISTORY 79, 79–80 (2009) (describing William 
Blackstone’s ten “rules to be observed with regard to the construction of statutes”). 
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to lie within the specific words found in the texts of the statutes, and 
they mattered as much or more than the words themselves. It was this 
method of statutory interpretation that allowed judges and jurists in 
earlier centuries to extend the reach of statutes to matters beyond the 
limited view of the men who drafted them. Now, this may look like 
“myth-making.” Then, it did not. 
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